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Agricultural policies  in both Europe  and the United States provide
commodities with an excessively high and distorted pattern of support.  The
economic  interdependencies  of the policies give  rise to  adverse fiscal and
economic costs, which are viewed as  disharmonies  in the existing policy
measures both within and between the  two regions.  Unilateral and
simultaneous EC and U.S. policy changes are simulated with an international
trade model.  They are carried in three steps:  (1) grains and feeds,  (2)
beef and dairy, and (3) sugar.  Both cross effects and own effects are
examined on typical policy targets.  Results suggest that while world
prices are sometimes drastically altered, the magnitude of  cross effects is
small and sometimes ambiguous compared to  own effects.  Feed livestock
linkages are dominant factors  in the economic rationale behind the
interactions between countries.  The case for cooperation in this trade
game is,  however, supported by the  evidence from at least a budget point of
view.BILATERAL HARMONIZATION OF EC AND U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICIES*
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I.  INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the  oil shocks the agricultural sectors  in most
countries have suffered from a long and deep crisis, although the timing of
events,  the economic factors  at work and the adjustment of policies have
been quite  different in various  areas.  The  European Community (EC)  and the
United States  (U.S.), as major producers  and traders of agricultural
products, have played a major part in the development of these events.  In
the European Community farm incomes were depressed after the first oil
shock.  This was mainly due to  a cost squeeze effect from high rates  of
inflation.  EC policy makers have tended to  alleviate these problems by
continuing the price support policies, being somewhat lured by the high
world prices of the early seventies.  In the  late seventies price supports
were curtailed but the downward pressure  on prices was somewhat relieved in
the early eighties  after the second oil  shock. In recent years high budget
costs, growing exportable surpluses and large public stocks have again
strengthened this pressure.
The U.S. had very good years  in the  seventies  as  real commodity prices
rose with trade volumes expanding, thanks  to  a weak dollar and a world
demand not yet choked by the  induced implications  of the oil boom and the
subsequent  economic slack.  As  the prospects  turned around, the 1980s
became unbearable as well in the U.S. and the costs of farm programs have
moved to  record levels.
Under these circumstances great hopes have been placed by many
countries  in the GATT negotiations, expecting a significant contribution
from a better discipline of international trade behavior.  It  is quitevisible that exporting countries  are more active, display more efforts to
alleviate trade barriers, and argue for free trade as a desirable target.
The U.S. appears to be part of that group.  Other countries which are
either importers or have inward looking agricultural policies exhibit much
less enthusiasm to  see action taken.  The  EC clearly belongs  to  the latter
group as its  policies were designed for a net importing situation while it
has now inadvertently become a net exporter of many commodities.  A lot of
external pressure  is now exerted on the EC  as  this net exporting situation
is viewed as lacking legitimacy since  it  is  largely due to protectionist
policies.
As a result of these developments EC-U.S. agricultural trade relations
have become tense over the last few years,  to a degree rarely attained
before.  Two dimensions seem to emerge in the context  of the EC-U.S.  trade
conflict.  One  is  the domestic political economy of agricultural policy
making which is  a widespread feature of developed countries becoming more
protectionist for agriculture as  they get richer  (Honma and Hayami, 1986).
The other is  the international dimension of farm policies.  Countries with
large trade shares cannot ignore both the consequences of partner policies
on their own agricultural targets,  nor the effects of their own programs on
other countries'  success or failure to  achieve their objectives.  This
interdependence creates an externality of a probable significant size that
is  induced by policies which are often designed only for domestic purposes
and mainly driven by domestic forces, but which impact other actors in the
world agricultural trade game.  In that context it  is certainly appealing
to view freer trade as  a public good since some passive actors  cannot beexcluded from potential gains  (Runge, et al.,  1987;  Ruttan and von Witzke,
1987).
In this paper we view the EC-U.S. relations  in a game framework, where
they are both active players with defined strategies and where the rest of
the world is essentially passive although not unaffected, since  it
participates  in world price and trade formation.  An attempt is made to
characterize the nature of  the game of the  trade war or policy cooperation
between the  EC and the U.S.  While aggressive actions were envisaged in a
previous  study (Mahe, et al.,  1987),  the design of  strategies, i.e.,
policy options, analyzed in the present work was geared toward discovering
areas for cooperation between the  two trading partners while contributing,
at the  same time,  to  the solution of domestic problems.  In that sense a
whole set of conceivable strategies will not be covered and only a partial
characterization of the U.S.-EC agricultural trade game will be
illustrated.
The policy options taken under consideration were defined in the
context of the study launched by the  EC Commission1  on "Disharmonies in EC
and U.S. Agricultural Policies".  The concept of "disharmony" in
agricultural policy measures  in this context  is viewed in a rather wide
perspective  (EEC, 1988,  Chap.  2).  A disharmony exists whenever "a set of
policies have not reached their objectives  given existing constraints".
The  concept  is not seen as being equivalent to  uneven rates  of protection
or to price distortions.  Instead, the policy targets  are expected to be
better fulfilled by reducing the  overall level of support and narrowing the
range of support rates provided to various commodities.
lit should be made clear that in the analysis described here, the
views are those of the authors and not of the  EC Commission.
3It seems fairly easy to trace back the origin of the budget costs and
of other costs  of both EC and U.S. agricultural policies to  the generally
high level of price support prevailing over the recent years.  But a
significant part of these costs are also due to  existing inconsistencies
within policy programs.  Some of them, for example, relate  to uneven rates
of support granted to  close substitutes either in production or in final
and intermediate consumption.  Everyone knows the famous case of grains
substitutes, but there are many other distortions of this kind when a
cross-commodity viewpoint is  taken in assessing agricultural policies.
Harmonization  in the present context consists of an adjustment of EC
and U.S. policies in three 2  steps dealing successively with (1) grains and
feeds,  (2)  meat and dairy, and (3) sugar.  The implications of these policy
changes on various policy targets are evaluated for each possible
combination of actions of the  two partners.  Estimates of both own and
cross  effects of the policy changes allow uncovering acceptable or
attractive combinations of strategies  for both countries.  As a consequence
the issue of coordination of policy reforms as opposed to isolated actions
are  assessed within our framework.
Section 2 describes the existing situation of disharmonies as related
to protection rates, and the actual context of  the contemplated policy
options.  In Section 3 some features of the model used and of the problems
of implementation are highlighted.  Section 4 is devoted to  the simulation
results with emphasis placed on the economic rationale behind interactions
21In  the original Study a fourth step dealt with fats which are not
considered here  (CEE, 1988).
4between EC and U.S. policies and on the opportunity for both countries to
act jointly.
II.  EXISTING DISHARMONIES  IN POLICIES
AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR HARMONIZATION
Disharmony is not equivalent to  even rates of support and even rates
of protection do not imply even rates of support.  However the large gap
between existing rates of protection provided to  commodities  are likely to
induce undesired budget costs and welfare losses.  Reducing some of these
gaps, while cutting down on the  general level of support,  is expected to
bring significant budget savings and welfare gains.
In Figure 1 are displayed estimates of protection rates  for
commodities  covered in the present study.  They can serve  as a basis to
discuss briefly some of the major disharmonies 3  existing in both EC and
U.S. agricultural policies.  The price  distortions induced by these
unbalanced rates of support across commodities have both domestic and
international implications, so  that perverse effects of domestic policies
may cross  the border and the cost of a disharmony may be externalized to
trade partners.
In the European Community one major well-known area of price
distortion is  the  grain-oilseeds-feed  (GOF) sector  (de Veer, 1986;  Mahe,
1984).  High grain prices  and zero tariffs on oilseeds and meals as well as
on so-called grain substitutes have induced a major substitution of
imported feeds for European produced grains in the  compound feed sector.
3A  broader picture  of existing disharmonies may be found in EEC,  1988,
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oGrain exports have been further enhanced and the cost of restitutions has
increased.  In order  to  improve  the level of  self-sufficiency in vegetable
protein used in animal  feed, the EC has also developed what amounts  to a
deficiency payments system on oilseeds to  promote  import substitution.  As
production grew, so did the costs  to CAP budget.  As can be seen in Figure
1, oilseeds have now become even more protected than grains  and the
downward pressure on grain support prices has shifted the budget burden
from grain to  the cost of expanded oilseeds production.  In this GOF
subsector price distortions occur between commodities which are close
substitutes  in both production and derived demand.
There are also likely distortions between feed pricing and livestock
products  pricing in the Community.  Cheaper imported proteins  are not quite
consistent with the highly protected dairy sector nor with the highly
supported meat products.  This has added to  the fast growing surplus
problem of dairy products  in Europe and also  induced artificial differences
in competitiveness between regions and member states.  As a consequence,
national interests have made  it unfeasible to design a common strategy to
attack this  problem at the  EC level, hence the long-lived status  quo.
EC's sugar policy  is also a stereotype combination of instruments
designed to  avoid some perverse effects arising from the  initial high price
support policy.  Import quotas from so-called ACP countries  (Africa,
Caribbean, Pacific) coexist with a costly export subsidy program, while a
producer's levy on both A and particularly B producers' quota are used to
alleviate budget cost.  The overall outcome is  a large consumer cost and
pervasive attempts to  stop other sweeteners  from substituting for beet or
cane sugar in the food  industry.The U.S. programs are also characterized by price distortions that
impact on budget and welfare.  A target price significantly higher than the
loan rate makes  the budget quite sensitive to world prices and to  the
strength of  the dollar  as  the early eighties have demonstrated.  The
absence of a target price scheme in the soybean programs  tends to
stimulate the substitution of corn for soybeans, thus making soybeans and
soybean by-products more expensive  relative to  feed grains  in animal feed.
As in the case of the  EC,  the U.S. has  an inconsistency between the non-
supported price of feeds and the highly protected dairy sector.  This
situation will hamper the efficiency of supply control measures of the
dairy sector.
Another typical and fairly far reaching distortion lies  in the beet
and can sugar program in the U.S.  This  sector, highly protected through
import quotas, has experienced decreasing market shares as the competition
from corn sweeteners was fostered by relatively cheap corn prices at the
user level.
The  latter case  illustrates how the international linkages  tend to
"export" the perverse effects of these disharmonies.  The U.S.  sugar  (and
alcohol) program stimulates  the production of byproducts of the sweeteners
industry, i.e.,  corn gluten feed, which cannot compete with cheap  feed
grains  in the U.S. but are sucked into  the EC because of high user grain
prices.  Hence  a further aggravation of EC unbalances and surpluses.  This
is a case where disharmonies in two countries  seem to  fuel each other
resulting in high costs for everybody.  Adverse effects  of EC and U.S.
disharmonies in price supports are also  transmitted to  other countries  like
New Zealand, Brazil, Argentina and other developing countries whose  economy
cannot afford the taxes  to support agriculture.The foregoing analysis of existing disharmonies paves the way to
design changes  likely to bring savings and social benefits to both
partners.  The rationale behind the  three policy options described in
Table 1 should be evident  from the analysis sketched above,  although the
magnitude of the changes reflects on intuitive assessment of balanced and
feasible packages rather than a strict economic rationale.
Option 1 implies a change of a single policy instrument in the U.S.4
In the  case of the EC,  Option 1 already  includes a balanced package aiming
at improving EC's situation and providing some relief to U.S. problems as
well;  hence the  large cut  in grain and oilseeds producer's price support
and the small border tax on imported feeds.  This option is  also expected
to be acceptable from the U.S.  point of view as  it  involves a large cut in
EC's grain restitutions.
The design of policy options  also embodies concerns about cross-
commodity effects,  input-output price distortions and, in particular, feed
livestock interactions.  This  is why pork and poultry prices are  cut and
dairy quota is  kept active  in EC  for Option 1, to  prevent creating perverse
effects in partial moves  toward harmonization.  It  is quite clear that
without the latter features  in Option 1 a significant part of the benefits
would have been lost through leakages  as  the  costs of existing policies in
the animal sector would increase.
Option 2 further strengthens  the balance  of support by cutting prices
for dairy and all meats.  Budget savings  are expected from avoiding a shift
of resources  (including land) to  even more costly commodities.  This
4A  target price  for soybeans was considered initially but  later
abandoned due to budget costs.Table  1.  Definition of Policy Options
Three active options are considered for each country beside the passive one.
They are made with packages which cumulates from 1 to 3.  Table 2 summarizes
the main features.
Table 1 - Definition of Simulated Options
EC
- Option  0










- 20  percent (support
price)
+ 10  percent tariff
- 20 percent (support price)
+ 10  p.c. tariff











- Option 2 - Option 1 and in addition:
- 15  p.c. (supp.price)
- 25  p.c. (supp.price)*
- 2 p.c. (supp.price)
no protection
- 25 p.c.  (supp.
price)*
no change
Option  3  - Option  2  and  in  addition:
- 40 p.c. on the A
quota price
- 30  p.c. on  the
support price
*effective producer price falls by only 20 percent in the  EC because of an
assumed 5 percent rent due  to  the quota.  Effective  consumer price falls by
less than 25  percent (namely 20  in the EC,  18  in the U.S.)  since  domestic






. sugarapproach follows  the perceived necessity to  design policy changes with a
global perspective on the sector.  Such a comprehensive approach is
necessary to  avoid perverse effects of partial measures correcting some
distortions while others are kept, as  suggested by the second best theory.
Option 3 pursues  the equilibration of supports or at least corrects
some gaps created by previous  changes.  Sugar price supports are cut
drastically to  avoid increasing the  rent on the A sugar quota and further
distortions between grains and sugar prices  as a result of Options 1 and 2.
In both EC  and U.S.,  significant consumer gains are also expected.
It  is not obvious from the starting point that both countries would
benefit from the complete  implementation of  the options.  The two partners
may not like equally a given step of  the harmonization process.  And it may
be that one partner would prefer some combination of options  and the other
a different one.  The outcomes of all possible combinations of options  from
no  change  (Option 0) to  full harmonization must be analyzed.  Then, upon
consideration of different policy targets likely equilibrium positions can
be uncovered, corresponding  to  the outcomes of a negotiation which would
follow the rules of the game defined here.  Table  2 stylizes the 16
possible solutions of  the process.  While the first row describes  a
unilateral EC movement toward harmonization, the  first column corresponds
to  an isolated U.S. move.  The diagonal displays the outcomes  of joint
action which can be contrasted with single-country harmonization in either
EC or U.S.
11Table 2. The structure of the combined options in the  "harmonization game".
: EC Harmonizes in the subsectors  :
|  Grains  Beef
None  and  and  Sugar
I  feed  dairy
0  1  2  3
United States
harmonizes in
None  0  I   (0,0)  (0,1)  (0,2)  (0,3)
Grains and feed  1 i  (1,0)  (1,1)  (1,1)  (1,2)
Beef and dairy  2 I  (2,0)  (2,1)  (2,2)  (2,3)
Sugar  3 |  (3,0)  (3,1)  (3,2)  (3,3)
III.  MODELLING INTERACTIONS BETWEEN EC AND
U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN A GAME FRAMEWORK
The various combinations of options  in Table  2 were simulated with the
trade model MISS, with cross checks made with the OECD  MTM model,
particularly for world price changes in the main scenarios.
MISS is  a simplified world trade model which allows  for comparative
static analysis of policy changes around a base situation.  In Thompson's
terminology it  is  a non spatial price equilibrium model.  When policy
changes occur  for one  or several commodities  in one or many countries,  the
model first  solves for the new supply and demand levels and for the world
price changes which bring the net world excess supply back to  zero.  Budget
cost, farm income and other indicators  for each economic zone  are
calculated in a  simplified fashion.  Trade  flows between the economic zones
cannot be calculated by this model.
12The behavior of the model  is  led by matrices of direct and cross-price
elasticities of  agricultural supply, of derived demand for feeds,  and of
final demand.  Domestic prices can be either exogenously fixed or linked to
world prices by protection rates  as  in the case of  fixed ad valorem
tariffs,  subsidies,  taxes;  shifts of supply, demand, or  exchange rates can
also be performed.
A.  Scope and Parameters
The basic model  is more fully described in Mahe and Moreddu (1986) but
it has been revised for the  present exercise  (see Mahe, et al.,  1988).  In
the current version it covers four zones:  EC,  U.S.,  rest of the world
market economies and centrally planned economies  (CPE).  The  latter are
supposed to be unresponsive to world price changes.  Therefore, only market
economies are involved in world price  adjustments to  EC and/or U.S. policy
changes, but the assumption made on CPE countries increases world price
sensitivity to policy changes in EC  and U.S.
The basic data include a balance  sheet for each zone and each product
and the levels of protection for the  reference period which is  in the
present case  a "representative 1986".  Seven commodity groups are  included:
(1) cereals  (wheat and coarse grains),  (2) oilcakes,  (3) cereal substitutes
(millings and other vegetal byproducts, corn gluten feed, manioc and citro-
pulp),  (4)  beef meat,  (5)  pork and poultry,  (6) milk, and (7) sugar.  It
should be clear  that the  aggregation of all  "substitutes" may raise some
problems of interpretation since they actually differ in  (a) their
currently existing protection rate;  (b)  their energy-protein ratio;  and
(c) their production conditions and therefore supply elasticities (manioc
vs.  corn gluten feed).  But  in the options defined in the Study, policies
affecting imported components are changed mostly in a parallel fashion.
13B.  Model Calibration and Choice of Elasticities
Supply and demand price elasticities are  shown in Annex Table 1.  They
are derived from a review of estimates used in other studies and adjusted
in the Study group.  Although there  is no  time scale in a comparative
static model, the magnitude of supply response must be calibrated with a
time horizon in mind.  It was a medium term 3 to 5 years in the present
case.
More consistency in the choice of the parameters was looked for in
order to improve the behavior of the model.  This consistency may be
improved, first, by using the homogeneity and symmetry properties of  the
output supply and derived demand system (Sakai, Diewert);  second, by making
use of technical knowledge like complementarity between beef and milk in
Europe, and substitution or independence in the U.S.  Attention was also
given to  the coherence between animal products response  to their own prices
and derived demand for feed response to these same prices.  This has been
made easier in MISS by distinguishing feed demand from food demand.
The approach consists of starting with a variable profit function, for
the whole sector with the seven included outputs plus one  for the rest of
agriculture and four feed items  (grains, vegetal proteins, grain
substitutes plus  two other inputs for completeness of variable intermediate
consumption).  Primary factors  are assumed fixed for the whole sector
except for capital.  The  shares of outputs and variable  inputs in variable
profit have been estimated for EC and U.S.,  adding grains  fed on farm to
the feed cost reported in the accounts and to  the final output in order to
capture  their full cost-derived demand effect.  Because of the
substitutability between outputs in European agriculture, the elasticities
14were assumed fairly large which is  in line with results  from various
econometric studies when cross effects are included.  Large cross effects
were often found in estimation work done on the agricultural sector in
France.  Slight output substitution between crops and grazing livestock is
assumed in Europe, less  so in the U.S.  A large substitutability is  assumed
between crops and a beef-milk complementarity is  introduced in Europe
(substitutability in the U.S.).  These  assumptions brought elasticities in
line with expected orders of magnitude.  The relationships between animal
products and feed elasticities made use  of the knowledge of the  intakes of
grain, cakes  and substitutes by each species estimated in another study
(Mahe and Munk, 1988).  The  elasticities of derived demand for feed with
respect  to  livestock products prices were deduced from its  own and cross
supply elasticities of these animal products weighted by corresponding
input shares  in total use  (locally constant proportions).  The symmetry
condition provided the effect of  feed prices on output supply.  The outcome
suggests that while substitution exists between individual feed items when
total feed  is constant, input substitutability decreases  sharply when the
output effect due  to animal supply response  to feed cost  is  included as  in
this full model matrix.  The more so  as we deal with aggregated groups of
ingredients, and as  the behavior  is meant to  represent medium run response.
This  is  in line with what Sakai calls a normal technology.
For the  rest of the world, cross effects were dropped because of
little knowledge and because natural conditions often differ from Europe
and the U.S.A. smaller direct elasticities were chosen as  a consequence.
The parameters used are assumed relevant for the medium term and are given
in Annex Table 2, their magnitude is  somewhat  in line with  those of the
15OECD  model and of Valdes and Zietz  (1980).  Published estimates of import
demand elasticity vary over a wide range according to methods and
specification (Gardiner and Dixit, 1987).  The information collected by
these authors suggests  that direct estimation leads to a smaller import
demand elasticity (in the case of U.S. grain exports) than the one implied
by deriving it from supply and demand elasticities.
C.  Policy Formulation and Model Outputs
There  is  a real challenge  in maintaining a simulation tool which can
accommodate many policy instruments which differ from one commodity to the
next and also often coexisting in the  same program for a given commodity.
The model MISS was originally designed to  simulate policy changes expressed
as  ad valorem tariff-equivalents, so  that an homogeneous treatment of
commodities was possible.
The introduction of variable levies, target price with deficiency
payments, production quotas,  import quotas, consumption subsidy,
correspondability levy, etc.,  makes difficult the task of adjusting the
model system, while keeping its general flexibility.
The model can accommodate coexisting instruments such as pegged
domestic prices  (supply and/or demand),  production quotas,  fixed ad valorem
tariffs, supply-demand shifts  (set aside).  In  the case  of production
quotas,  the budget cost, income and consumer surplus changes  are
calculated by using the relevant market price changes while supply and
derived demand behavior is  led by the effective or  shadow price changes.
There are  some difficult cases such as  EC's dairy or  sugar quotas where a
stock of rent has to be exhausted before actual supply response can take
place.  In the case of dairy, a five percent rent  is assumed and for  sugar
16the 40 percent gap between A and B prices are treated as a rent so  that
supply does not react to  the price cut, while only demand does.  The
capability to peg or alter domestic prices leads  to  an assumption of zero
elasticity of price transmission from world to  domestic prices  in the
relevant cases.  For other commodities, as  for soybeans5  in the U.S.  (both
supply and demand) or oilseeds in the  EC  (only demand side),  domestic
prices follow proportionally world prices.
There  are no storage costs in the model.  Excess supply has to be
financed either by export subsidies,  foreign donations or delayed
deficiency payments  (PIK program).  In the U.S.,  the set-aside program was
specified as  an export supply shift on the bases of external  information
(e.g.,  Meyers,  et al.;  Gardiner;  OECD).  In the  EC,  the complex sugar
policy is  specified in an ad hoc fashion, so  as  to  reflect mainly the
relevant budget savings6  and income  losses.
The  farm income  indicator used is  the value added, i.e.,  the
difference between total sales and feed and other purchased inputs.  It is
assumed that the prices of commodities excluded from the study are
unchanged as well as  the prices  of intermediate consumption other than
feed.  The procedure used to  calibrate the supply system allows one  to make
the relevant  calculations.  Resources  are shifted toward the  "rest of
agriculture"  and income  effects  are dampened as  a consequence.  Budget
costs are calculated with a simple formula which is  directly applicable
5If loan rates had been pegged in the U.S.,  EC's influence on the U.S.
soybean program would have shifted from farm income  to  the budget.
61In  the case  of sugar the export refunds corresponding to ACP  import
quota were not considered as  a part of the domestic sugar regime cost  (but
development aid).
17when policy instruments are  support prices, corresponsibility  levies,
deficiency payments, tariffs or export refunds.  Consumer surplus changes
are calculated in the traditional Marshallian way.  The welfare  indicator
is  the sum of the transfer changes  (producer, consumer, taxpayer).
D.  Estimation of Protection Rates, Domestic and "World" Prices
For each product and each zone, protection rates  representative of the
protection provided to  producers, to  animal feed uses and to human
consumption are calculated.  EC and U.S. protection rates  are calculated
for  the year 1986,  except for some cases where  the year 1985 was used due
to lack of more recent data.  The results of  these estimations are reported
in Annex Table 3.
Two methods are used to  derive the protection rates.  In the case of
price support programs that directly lead to budget expenditures or budget
receipts  (deficiency payments, variable import levies, export subsidies,
etc.),  government spending data are used to  calculate  the corresponding
protection rates.  For policies  such as  import or production quotas where
the gap between domestic and world prices is  not reflected by budget
expenditures, protection rates are generally approximated by a ratio of
domestic to border prices.
IV.  MAIN RESULTS OF HARMONIZATION OF EC AND U.S. POLICIES
It  is out of  the scope of this paper to  analyze  in detail the supply
demand, trade,  price, etc.,  changes for each country--product--option
combination.  Only the essential effects on selected policy targets are
summarized in Table 3.
18A.  Own Effects and the Economics of Harmonization  (first row;  first
column)
When EC moves alone toward Option 3, quite significant changes occur
in both the domestic and the world markets.  Option 1 (0,1) grain surpluses
disappear in the  EC, which drives world prices up by over 5 percent.  The
tariff on oilcakes and grain substitutes, together with the cut  in pork and
poultry prices,  depress the demand for imported feed and world prices of
oilcakes  and substitutes drop, particularly for the latter which are mainly
by-products.  As  Option (0,1) involves  some offsetting factors  (cheaper
grains but more expensive cakes and substitutes, limited animal  sector
expansion) trade and income  effects  are not very large.  Budget savings are
significant.
Option  (0,2) brings about the largest changes from EC's point of view
because the animal sector is  deeply affected.  As  a consequence feed demand
in the  EC  is  driven further down and world prices  for cakes and grain
substitutes  drop sharply, while the price of cereals recedes from the
level reached in Option (0,1).  The costs of grain and oilseeds programs
increase  somewhat from step 1 as  the  cut in animal production has restored
the grain surplus.  Huge  EC budget savings  take place on the  costly beef
and dairy market regimes as  the  EC moves  from a surplus  to  a net importer
position.  These  adjustments drive world prices up  drastically for  these
two products.  Incomes suffer a steep decline  (minus 16 billion ECU) and
the  trade balance deteriorates significantly.  Consumers gain up to  11
billion ECU and overall welfare  improves by about 5 billion.
19Table 3 : Summary of result of harmonization effects on selected indicators(1)
1C  «  orli  :  : orld  i  vorld  ;  eorld
option  0  price  1  price  2  price  3  price
US  billion ECU  change  billion  ECU  :change  billion  ECO  :change  billion  ECU  change
option  t  I  t  8  t
..  - IS  2.89  I  10.01  IS  10.21  a
- . TS-1.45  TS  -6.50  TS  -5.12  :
Gil  a  " C  VA  -2.51  5.10  VI  -16.11  3.70  7  -1S.1  1 3.70
7!?  :  TT  0.15  -2.40  TT  0.28  -5.50  TT  0.29  -5.50
GSO  CS  3.30  -10.50  CS  10.84  -16.80  - CS  13.01  -16.80
BEE  0  VG  3.31  -1.70;  IG  4.74  7.20  IG  5.14  7.20
PiP  :S  1.75  -0.10 !IS  1.34  -0.0  BIS  1.32  -0.10
aIL  ;TS  0.23  0.10  TS  -0.08  20.00  ITS  -001  I  20.00
aSG  V1  -1.29  -0.03 :V7  -1.2  -0.05  TI  -1.27  3.90
US  TT  0.43  :T  0.28  ;TT  0.28
'CS  -0.30  :CS  -0.07  CS  -0.07  ;
IG  0.16  IG  -0.01  1G  -0.02  :
Sa----a-----------------------a  - ---------------- I ---- a----------------a---
IS  -0.06  IS 2.81  :  IS 9.97  IS  10.21
TS  0.02  TS  -1.41  TS  -6.411  TS  -6.73  a
GI1  aV1  0.09  3.40  VI  -2.44  5.90  V  -16.00  4.20  V1 -18.07  4.10
P  TT  0.05  -1.60  TT  0.1  -4.00  TT  0.34:  -7.10  TT  0.34  -7.10
GSU  CS  0.02  -0.35  CS  3.00  -10.75 1  CS  10.84  -17.05  CS  13.01  -17.05
IIB  1  IG  0.05  -0.40 I  IG  3.38  -2.10  I  IG  4.81  6.10  I  G  5.522  1  6.10
P&P  IlBS  4.74  -0.10  :BS  6.49  -10.30  :IS  6.10  -1.00  BIS  6.09  -1.00
IL  ITS  0.14  -0.40  TS  0.35  -0.05 ITS  0.07  19.40  TS  0.06  19.40
SUG  i1  -3.70  -C.10  :71  -5.06  S -0.17  i -5.01  -0.20  71  -5.00  3.70
a  TT  -0.03  ITT  0.39  1  TT  0.27  TT  0.27
:CS  0.00  CS  -0.29  ICS  -0.06  ICS  -0.06
;G  1.03  IG  1.14  1IG  1.03  :IG  1.03
-a----------------a
S  0.34  BS  J.30  BS  9.87  I  IS  10.11
S  TS  0.36  TS  -0.75  S  -6.35  i  TS  -6.67  1
G:  a  V  0.04  -1.560  71  -2.25  3.70  71  -15.34  2.50  V -17.91  2.40
E?  P  TT  0.56  -3.20  TT  0.80  -5.60  TT  0.34  -1.40  n  0.35  -8.40  ;
GSO  CS  0.19i  -2.20  CS  3.00  -12.20  CS 10.84  -18.40  I  CS  13.01  8-18.40
BE  2  I  I  0.57  1.25:  IG 4.05  0.:20  i  4.87  5.50  II  G  5.21  :  5.50
PiP  IBS  6.44  -0.90  IBS  8.06  -1.70  1SS  7.43  -1.90  S  7.42  I  -1.90  ;
EIL  :TS  -2.34  16.45  TS  -2.42  16.70  1 S  -2.17  39.30  ITS  -2.17  39.30 I
SSUG  IVi  -7.62  -0.40  :l  -9.13  -0.50 :V -8.25  -0.40  7A  -8.34  3.50
STT  -0.56  TT  -0.13  I  T  -0.73  :TT  -0.74
!CS  3.90  CS  4.01  CS  2.88  ICS  2.88
IG  2.72  IG  2.54  i G  1.96  IG  1.Sir
a~~~~~~~~-  a---------------  - - - - --
a  IS  0.35  BS  3.31  iS  9.88  :  IS  10.10
I  TS  0.39  TS  -0.71  TS  -6.31  TS  -6.65
G a  I  V  0.05  -1.70  1  VI  -2.23  3.60  :1  -15.82  2.40  I  V  -17.89  2.40
VP  TT  0.62  -3.60  T  0.83  -6.00G  TT  0.38: -8.70  TT  0.37  -8.70
SGSOU  CS  0.19  :  -2.10  I  CS  3.00  -12.10 :  CS  10.81  -18.30 1  CS  13.08  1-18.30
bII  3  IG  0.59  1.25  IG  4.08  0.20  IG  4.90  5.45 :  I  5.29 : 5.45
PI?  :IS  6.79  -0.90  IBS  8.41  -1.80  IBS  7.78  -1.90  lBS  7.73  1 -1.90
IL  ITS  -2.81  :16.40  ITS  -2.89  16.70  :TS  -2.64  39.30  ITS  -2.66  I  39.30 1
SUG  71  -8.55  3.70  :fl  -10.07  3.70  VA -9.265  3.70 iV  -9.28  I  7.90
STT  -0.61  ITT  -0.1  ITT  -0.71  ITT  -0.10  . 8
I  ICS  5.05  CS  5.15  CS  1.02  ICS  4.03
SiG  3.28  a  IG  3.49  IG  2.51  I  IG  2.48  I  I
(1) The nuabers  correspond to  changes  trot  the  base situation  (0,0)
IS * Budget saving ;  TS  * Trade surplus :  Vl  Value added :  TT  * Terns of  trade effects :  CS a  Cons.  surplus ;  IS  * lelfare gain
CG1l  Grains ; TIP * Vegetable proteins  ;  GSU  GCrain  substitutes ; bIEE  * ovine seat  :  PIP  *  Pork and poultry  :  IlL  * lilk :
SUG  * Sugar.
20When Option 3 is  implemented in the  EC, world prices for sugar rise
(4  percent) but not much happens on the budget, although a significant
transfer takes place from producers  to  consumers  (part of the rent on the A
quota).
Altogether, our results suggest that policy harmonization in EC up  to
Option 3, greatly alters world price ratios.  First, between feed grains
and other feed ingredients;  second, between feeds and livestock products.
Sugar prices  do not respond much due to  the sizeable rent on the EC  quota.
For  the  EC, Option 2 carries  the  largest implications for both the European
farm sector and for world markets.  Noticeably, when the EC undertakes such
a reduction of the animal sector, world prices of grains and other  feeds
are depressed, and the economics of harmonization appear dominated by the
swinging effects between Option 1 and 2 due to  the major feed-livestock
linkages in European agriculture.
While Option 2 brings about the largest changes to  EC when it moves
alone,  it  is option 1 which produces  the largest effects on the U.S. when
the U.S. moves alone as well:  nearly 5 billion ECU budget savings and
about 4 billion loss  in U.S. farm income.  World prices are not much
altered since participation rate almost offsets  the effects  of the target
price cut.  In Option  (2,0)  the U.S.  lowers dairy prices, and imports  are
allowed at  the  cost of a levy.  Significant budget savings  occur on
domestic and foreign donations  of dairy products.  Since grain exports
increase as a result  of smaller feed demand, the crop programs cost more
than in Option  (1,0),  partly offsetting the savings made on dairy.  This
option brings about  large transfers between farm income and consumers
(about 4 billion ECU).  World prices are affected mainly in the case of
21dairy products  (16 percent),  feed-to-dairy products price ratios  are deeply
altered and feeds also become somewhat cheaper relative to beef.
In Option  (3,0) the U.S. would cut sugar support price and allow sugar
imports to  flow-in with the relevant  tariff.  No large budget saving occur,
but again, significant transfers take place from producers to consumers.
World prices move up by about 4 percent, an amount similar to  the effect of
EC  sugar price cut.
When each country harmonizes separately world prices are  significantly
altered and often in the  same direction.  When both countries move in
concert, world price changes7  tend to cumulate, particularly for animal
products, non-grain feeds and sugar, but they tend to  offset each other in
the case of grains.  These world price changes  are the major components in
the interactions between the two countries  as  suggested by the review of
the cross  effects.
B.  Cross  Effects and Simultaneous Harmonization Results
In view of the hot debates and war trade threats between the EC and
the U.S.,  one might expect that cross effects of policy changes between
countries would be sizeable and that simultaneous harmonization would look
much more attractive than isolated policy changes.  It hardly seems  to be
the case except in one  instance:  the U.S. grain program.  The main aspects
of interactions between the EC and the U.S.  in the harmonization context
can be summarized as  follows:
(1) Cross-country effects of policy changes  are smaller than domestic
effects.  This  is  in line with the observation that domestic policies
7World price changes do not exactly add up  as  some changes of policy
instruments occur along the way.
22rather than foreign policies account for the larger part of farm sector
problems.
There are several reasons for that to be expected in spite of the
sometimes drastic world price changes.  First, part of the adjustment is
absorbed by the rest of the world.  Second, EC and U.S. policies tend to
insulate domestic prices  (with a few exceptions).  Third, domestic changes
have both volume and price  effects while foreign policies have only world
prices effects on the budget.  And last, since protection levels are  fairly
high in the reference period, the  absolute magnitude of world price changes
are  smaller than the  domestic ones for similar percentage variations.
The  implications  of these results are that domestic forces will
probably matter more than foreign pressures,  in the adjustment process of
the EC  and the U.S.  farm policies.
(2) EC's action as  defined here, has more influence on the U.S.  than
the converse  for most indicators.  This  is particularly relevant for budget
and farm income.  The main reason lies  in the U.S. grain program cost which
is  sensitive to world prices because  of the deficiency payment system.  The
U.S. budget benefits from EC's action but farm income is hurt because of
more expensive  feed grains and of cheaper soybean prices.  U.S. action has
little effect on EC's budget  (first column Table 3) except through better
world prices  for milk which brings  some savings partly offset by lower
prices for grains and cakes.
(3) Cross  effects of EC on the U.S.  tend to weaken as  EC's
harmonization is  completed, but the  converse is not true.  This  is mainly
due  to  the receding demand for feeds  in the  EC in Option 2 which restores
EC's position as  a grain exporter.  This positive contribution of  the
23action of the  EC to  the U.S. budget would even decrease faster if the
soybean loan rate had been pegged in the U.S. options,  since world prices
for cakes  dropped by more than 5 percent in Option  (0,3).
(4) Cross effects on the budget  tend to fade when harmonization is
carried simultaneously, they may even change  sign in the case of the U.S.
influence on the EC.  The cross effect in the first row and first column
are  smaller to  the ones occurring along the diagonal  of Table 3, in spite
of wider and mostly cumulative world price changes.  Clearly, the reason is
that as harmonization makes progress, protection levels and/or exportable
surpluses become smaller, making one country's budget less sensitive  to
world price changes due to the partner's action (see  Figure 2).
Overall, if emphasis is  placed on budget costs,  the U.S. might prefer
the EC  to move to Option 1 and stay there, but the EC  cannot afford to
adjust only the crop sector.  The meat and dairy industries also have  to be
harmonized to  capture the largest saving potentials.  But then the benefit
for  the U.S. tends to  decline and the advantages of the EC moves becomes
less attractive from the U.S. point of view.  If budget savings were  the
only policy targets both countries would then move to Option 3.  But, if
the partners would focus on other policy targets, other combinations of
options would then become more likely as  illustrated in Table 4.
24Table 4.  Policy Targets and Possible Equilibrium Options
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A5.  DISCUSSION  - CONCLUSION
The  interpretation of these results  is made bearing in mind that the
various effects have been simulated in a comparative static framework and
cannot be viewed as  projections.  In particular, the absence of the time
dimension and of  technical progress may lead to misinterpretation if the
harmonization  steps are just transposed in a dynamic  context without
caution.  For example,  if enough time  is allowed, technical progress may
offset price cuts and income would not actually fall compared to now, but
it would fall compared to a no-policy change reference.
This aspect  is also  important for the  interactions between country
policies.  For example, Option 2 in EC induces a trade reversal for milk
and beef, which makes  the U.S. action contribute negatively on the EC
budget  (lower levy proceeds);  such an adverse effect would not occur if EC
does not become an importer  (as  in the first column in Table  3, which would
likely be  the  case if the price  cut is  spread over several years).
Another issue  is  the sensitivity of the results of the analysis  to  the
parameters of the model.  The  sensitivity cannot be discussed in general
but only with respect to  issues.  Income and consumer effects are probably
not very sensitive to most parameters  and particularly to those of the rest
of  the world.  The  latter are important for world price reactions.  They
seem  to be generally larger or in line with results  of other studies  (OECD,
1987;  1986) but they can be  sensitive  to  the assumed parameters for the
rest of  the world for which a satisfactory empirical basis  is  lacking.
Some particular EC-U.S.  interactions  are sensitive  to  the world price
response, particularly since the balance of many offsetting components  is
small  in most cases.  As  the U.S. budget is  sensitive to  EC's policy
27changes affecting grains, world price  response of grains  is an important
assumption.
One may think that world prices would react more, particularly in  the
short run, increasing the magnitude of the interactions, but if the rest of
the world parameters are meant to be relevant for the shorter run, the
domestic parameters should be adjusted down accordingly and supply
considered as  inelastic.  One may also consider that world markets are
segmented due to  imperfect competition and that price would be more
volatile than reflected in such a price equilibrium model.  But, the
contemplated policy adjustments are relevant to  the longer run where trade
flows can adjust rather easily if outlet opportunities become available  (as
the grain substitutes problem of  the EC seems  to confirm).
Some particular results may then be sensitive  to assumption.  However,
the conclusion that domestic policies are more important than the partner's
policies seems particularly robust, as well as the greater influence of EC
on the U.S. budget than the converse, mainly because of  the crop deficiency
payment scheme, which is  less insulating than most other U.S. and EC farm
programs.
With these qualifications in mid and if budget savings  are given a
great  importance, the case for cooperation of both partners in adjusting
their policies simultaneously appears to be rather clear and the fact that
mutual benefits are larger at the beginning of the process may help
initiate  negotiations in a constructive spirit.
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30Annex  Table  1
a) EC supply and derived demand elasticities
Output  Prices  Varii












ible  input  prices
VIP  GSU
-0.00  -0.06  -0.04  -0.06  -0.07  -0.23  0.01  0.00  0.00
0.00  -0.06  -0.04  -0.09  -0.07  -0.15  0.00  0.00  0.00
0.08  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
0.00  0.76  -0.04  0.19  -0.02  -0.15  -0.11  -0.05  -0.05
0.00  -0.03  1.93  -0.04  -0.01  -0.13  -0.83  -0.11  -0.18
O.00  0.14  -0.04  0.97  -0.01  -0.26  -0.11  -0.06  -0.06
0.00  -0.06  -0.04  -0.04  0.90  -0.14  0.00  0.00  0.00
0.00  -0.06  -0.06  -0.15  -0.01  0.69  0.00  0.00  0.00
0.00  0.13  1.05  0.17  0.00  0.00  -0.97  0.02  0.02
0.00  0.19  0.53  0.32  0.00  0.00  0.06  -0.62  -0.08
0.00  0.19  0.84  0.34  0.00  0.00  0.06  -0.08  -0.81
b)  US supply and derived demand elasticities
Output  Prices Variable  input prices









-0.00  -0.04  -0.01  -0.02  -0.00  -0.06  0.00  0.00  0.00
0.00  -0.04  -0.01  -0.04  -0.02  -0.09  0.00  0.00  0.00
0.27  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
0.00  0.60  -0.05  -0.02  -0.00  -0.12  -0.10  -0.01  -0.00
0.00  -0.08  1.09  -0.06  -0.00  -0.11  -0.36  -0.13  -0.02
0.00  -0.04  -0.08  0.84  -0.:0  -0.22  -0.16  -0.02  -0.01
0.01  -0.08  -0.05  -0.04  0.64  -;.11  0.00  0.00  0.00
0.00  -0.16  -0.09  -0.15  -0.01  0.74  0.00  0.00  0.00
0.00  0.21  0.47  0.17  0.00  0.00  -0.51  0.01  0.00
0.00  0.06  0.65  0.08  0.00  0.00  0.04  -0.49  -0.01
0.00  0.14  0.49  0.25  0.00  0.00  1  0.04  -0.05  -0.52
Gil  a  Grains
VIP  a Vegetal Proteins
GSU  2  Grains substituts
BEE  a•  ef
PUP  P  Pork and  Poultry
MIL  =  lilk
SUG  2  Sugar
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Direct and cross price elasticities of  final demand
trices US Prices
0.02  0.02  0.01
0.20  0.10  0.00
0.20  0.10  0.00
0.20  0.04  0.00
-0.60  0.00  0.00
0.00  -0.28  0.00








-0.40  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.02  0.02
00.00  .00  0.00  0.00  0.20  0.10
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.10  0.20  0.10
0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.70  0.30  0.04
0.01  0.00  0.00  0.20  -0.60  0.00
0.01  0  0.0  0.00  0.05  0.00  -0.40
0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
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Annex  Table  3
Protection coefficients and world prices
US lest of  the world






















Product  Andfeed  Oth.Uses
1.56
1.10
1.00
1.05
1.00
1.80
2.20
1.10
1.00
1.00
1.05
1.00
1.80
2.20
1.10
1.00
1.00
1.05
1.00
1.69
2.20
32
Ic
Grains
V.Prot.
Subs
Beef
PiP
lilk
Sugar
-0.410
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00  0.02
0.00  0.00
0.00  0.10
0.00  -0.70
0.00  0.23
0.00  0.05
0.00  0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00 0.00
0.25
-6.25
IC
Grains
V.Prot.
Subs
left
PiP
lilk
Sugar
forld prices
100.00
164.00
120.00
2000.00
1210.00
143.00
200.00